Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1962

Homer W. Hanson and Beth P. Hanson v. Beehive
Security Co. : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Kirton and Bettilyon; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents;
Nielsen, Conder and Hansen; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hanson v. Beehive Security Co., No. 9682 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4067

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~i

-vs.-

.)

~~J

HOMER W. HANSON and
BETH P. HANSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs- Respondents,

Case
No. 9682

BEEHIVE SECURITY COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendant -Appellant.

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENTS
Appeal From the Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County,
HoNORABLE JosEPH G. JEPPSON, JuDGE
KIRTON AND BETTILYON
VERDEN E. BETTILYON and
GEoRGE J. RoMNEY

336 So. 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plain.tiffsRespondents
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN
DEAN

E.

CoNDER

510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-.Ap·pella;n.t
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT..................................................

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL........................................................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... ·-·----------·····---------·---················-··············

2

ARGUMENT ························---·-·········-··--------·----···········-······················--

5

POINT I A DEED EXECUTED BY THE GRANTOR, WITH THE
NAME OF THE GRANTEE LEFT BLANK, IS VOID
AND PASSES NO TITLE UNLESS FILLED IN BY
THE GRANTOR OR BY HIS AGENT THEREUNTO
AUTHORIZED IN WRITING ....................................................

5

POINT II.THE AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT TO EXECUTE A
DEED FOR HIS PRINCIPAL MUST BE IN WRITING......
CONCLUSION

18
20

Cases Cited
Beatty v. Shelly, 42 Utah 592, 132 P. 1160 (1913)........................

6, 7

Burnham, et al., v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P. 2d 96 (1949)....

6

Curlee, et al., v. Morris, 196 Ark. 779, 120 S.W. 2d 10 (1938) .... 8, 9, 10
Green v. MacAdam, 175 Cal. App. Rep. 2d 481,
346 P. 2d 474 (1959) ............................................12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
LeVine, et al., v. Whitehouse, et al., 37 Utah 260,
109 p. 2 ( 1910) ···············-················-·····················-·············--··········
Utah State Building and Loan Association v. Perkins,
et al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (1918) ......... ·-······----·······--···--····-

18
7, 8

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 25-5-L...........................................

19

Annotations
27 ALR 606 ............................................................................................

19

Miscellaneous Authorities
19 Am. Jur. 642, Estoppel, Section 42................................................
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

Tiffany on Real Property, Third Edition, Section 969........ 10, 11, 19, 20

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE o~F UTAH
HOMER W. HANSON and
BETH P. HANSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs - Respondents,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9682

BEEHIVE SECURITY COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendant- Appellant.

BRIEF

o~F

RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to determine the validity and effect
of a real estate mortgage entered into between Willard J. Stringer, Viola Stringer and Beehive Security
Company.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case is an appeal by the Defendant, Beehive
Security Company, of the judgment entered April 6,
1962, in Civil No. 132132 of the District Court of Salt
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Lake County by Judge Joseph G. Jeppson wherein the
court decided that the mortgage entered into between
Willard J. Stringer, Viola Stringer and Beehive Security
Company 'vas cancelled, annulled, rescinded and held
for naught.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the judgment of the lo,ver
court in their favor sustained.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of convenience the parties shall be referred to as they appeared belo"T.
On July 5, 1961, the Plaintiffs entered into an
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, "~herein
they appeared as Sellers, and Bonneville Securities Corporation, a Utah Corporation, appeared as Buyer. The
properties to be sold under this Agreement "~ere nine
four-plexes and one home o'vned by the Plaintiffs, all of
which property is located in Davis County, Utah. Lines
27 and 28 of the Earnest "JioiH_~y Receipt and Offer to
Purchase provide as follo,Ys : ''Contract of Sale or Instrument of conveyance to be made on the approved form
of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board in the name of BONNEVILLE SECURITIES CORP. (In process of being
formed.}" (TR-75 and Exhibit 7.)
On August 1, 1961, the parties to the transaction met
in the office of Lothaire Rich, a La,vyer and Real Estate
2
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Broker, to complete the transaction. The necesesary
deeds for the accomplishment of this transaction were
prepared hy l.~othairP Rich and, at the time of closing,
there \\'Pre a total of ten deeds - five of 'vhich had the
name of Bonneville Securities Corporation filled in a.s
Grantee, and the other five deeds 'vere blank as to the
Grantee ( TR-6, 7). During the course of the closing of
the transaction, some of the documents connected ""ith
the transartion \vere still in the process of being typed
and there "·as considerable commotion and movement
of people in and out of the office during the closing
(TR-8, 9). In ans,ver to Plaintiffs' question as to why
some of these deeds \vere left blank (as to Grantee) they
\vere told that they \Yould be taken care of (TR 32). At
all times during this transaction, Plaintiffs dealt with
Bonneville Securities Corporation and intended that
Bonneville Seenrities Corporation's name be filled in as
the Grantee in all of the deeds connected with the transaction, (TR-10) and at all times were relying on their
.Attorney, ~~ r. Lothaire Rich, to take care of this. Both
Mr. and Mrs. Hansen testified that they at no time kne"\\.,.
that any other name other than Bonneville Securities
Corporation was to be filled in on any of the blank deeds
(TR-12, 13 and 34), and the Plaintiffs were not told that
any other name ".,.as to be filled in ( TR-50). Thereafter,
l\Ir. Rich did not fill in any of the names of the Grantees
in the blank deeds (TR-48), but instead, delivered all of
of the deeds (both those filled in and those in blank), to
~Ir. Boyd Fullmer, President of Bonneville Securities
Corporation (TR-48). :3fr. Fullmer testified that four of
the five deeds 'vere filled in by Bonneville Securities
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

Corporation with the name of "Stringer"; that the typing on Exhibit 2 (the deed directly concerned with this
action), appeared not to have been filled in by them,
because the typing was different from the Bonneville
Securities Corporation typewriter ( TR-60, 61). This
deed was, however, filled in \vith the names of Willard J.
Stringer and Viola Stringer as joint tenants and not as
tenants in common.
On August 2, 1961, Stringers took this deed to the
Defendant, Beehive Security Company, and obtained a
loan secured by a mortgage on this said property from
the Defendant, Beehive Security Company. During all
of this period of time, the Plaintiffs \vere in possession
of, and collecting the rents from, the property and \Vere
working on or about the premises for an eight -hour
period each day ( TR-16). Prior to making the loan, the
Defendant, Beehive Security Ciompany, took only a superficial look at the property ( TR-41) and failed to make
any inquiry of the tenants of the four-plexes, as to
\vho owned the premises or to \vhom rent \vas paid and
did not make any independent titlesearch of the property, although Stringers brought \Yith them a title insurance report from Black .;\ bstract Company, at the time
the load \Vas made. This same title insurance report \vas
used in Lothaire Rich's office (TR-40).
On the completion of the closing, ~Ir. Hanson \vent
to Idaho for business purposes. He thereafter returned
to Salt Lake City and went to the office of I.Aothaire Rich
to collect part of the payment, in the amount of $1,000.00,
which he ""as supposed to haYc received on the tran~ar4
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tion. The money was not available and nlr. Hanson
bceame very upset (TR-13, 14). He thereupon returned
to Idaho to record certain doeuments which he had
received as consideration for the ~ale of the duplexes
and upon returning home, stopped at Farmington, Utah,
to check the records ·w·ith regard to the nine four-plexes.
It \Vas discovered, at that time, that four of the deeds had
been recorded in Stringer '8 name and one of the deeds
was missing (TR-15). The deed that was missing is the
one directly involved in this lawsuit (TR-15). The Plaintiffs had discovered that the consideration for the sale of
the four-plexes 'vas defective and immediately contacted
l'" erden E. Bettilyon, an Attorney, who filed a lawsuit in
the matter and a Lis Pendens was recorded on the subject
property at 8:30 A.~I. on August 7, 1961. Thereafter, on
August 7, 1961, at 11:05 A.1f., the deed and mortgage
involved in this lawsuit were recorded at the request of
Beehive Security Company.
Subsequently, Defendants, Bonneville Securities
Corporation, Willard J. Stringer and Viola Stringer, his
'vife, stipulated to a rescission of the contract.

ARGU~IENT
PoiNT

I.

A DEED EXECUTED BY THE GRANTOR,
WITH THE NA~IE OF THE GRANTEE LEFT
BLANK, IS VOID AND PASSES NO TITLE
UNLESS FILLED IN BY THE GRANTOR OR
BY HIS AGENT THEREUNTO AUTHORIZED
IN WRITING.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This principle is clearly recognized by the Utah
Supreme ~Court in the case of Burnham et al., v. Eschler,
116 Utah 61, 208 P. 2d 96 (1949). There, the Court
set down the rule as follo"\\rs :
"Admittedly, a paper purporting to be a deed, but
which is blank as to the grantee, is no deed and is
ineffective as a conveyance while the blank remains. See the cases collected in the annotation
at 32 A. L. R. 737 and 17 5 A. L. R. 1294. Also, if
the name of a grantee is inserted by a party 'vho
never legally obtained possession of the instrument nor obtained authority from the grantor
to complete the instrument no deed comes into
existence. Beatty v. Shelly, 42 Utah 592, 132 P.
1160; Utah State Building and Loan v. Perkins,
53 Utah 47 4, 173 P. 950. But if the blank is filled
by the grantor or his agent in accordance with
instructions given him, the deed upon delivery
becomes operative as a conveyance.''
Obviously, in the case now before the Court, the
deed was not filled i11 the grantor nor by any agent of
the grantor, but rather, the deed passed from Lothaire
Rich to Boyd Fullmer and from Fullmer to Stringer~
(still in blank) ( TR-48), ( TR-61). There never \\"'as any
privity of contract or agreement of any kind bet"\\"'een the
Plaintiffs and Stringers. Thus, in this case, the blank
'vas filled in by one who 'vas neither the grantor nor an
agent of grantor and who had received no instructions
which authorized the filling in of the blanks.
This rule of law was recognized early by the Utah
Supreme Court, in the ease of Beatty -v. Shelly, 42 Utah
592, 132 P. 1160 (1913). There, as in the rase now· be6
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fore the Court, the person filling in the grantee's name
never legally obtained po~~ession of the deed, nor had he
ever obtainrd authority from the grantor to insert his
O\vn name in the deed, as grantee:
" ... Appellant simply assumed that he had a
a right to the deed and to insert his own name
as grantee therein; but this assumption neither
did, nor could creatr any legal nor equitable right
to the land in question. We can see no ground
\\,.hatevrr upon \\"hich the Appellant can succeed in
this rase under the evidence in the record."
The Utah case of Utah State Btt~Jilding and lAJan
Association "'· Perkins, et al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950
(1918) is pertinent to this matter. There, Perkins \vas
Treasurer of the Plaintiff SaYings and Loan Association.
1\ shortage had developed in his accounts, and in order
to secure such shortage, if any were found to exist, Perkins and his wife signed their name to two blank deeds
and acknowledged the same before a Notary Public, 'vho
was a Stenographer in the bank. The deeds "\vere thereafter kept in the possession of Perkins, or, at least, on
his desk 'vith other personal papers. Later on, the deeds
\\"ere remoYed from Perkin's desk by the same Stenographer. The legal description and th0 names of the grantors and grantees \vere filled in. The deeds \\"ere then
delivered, completely filled in, to an officer of the bank,
\\"ho recorded them. The officer of the bank testified that
at the time he first saw the deeds, which was the day
they were recorded, the description and all blanks had
been completely filled in. The Court cited the statute,
Compiled La \VS 1907, Section 1974, which is substantially
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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identical to Section 25-5-1 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and commented as follows:
''The provisions of that statute, in order to
convey title to real estate, contemplate that the
instrument shall be in writing at the time it is subscribed by the party executing it, and when written shall be declared by him, or acknowledged,
that it is executed for the purpose as stated in th(l
writing."
The Court then said :
''I find no authority holding a conveyance effective under similar facts as appear in this record. On the contra.ry,. there appears to be no conflict that blank deeds or blank papers executed as
these were are void a11d do not convey a;ny interest or title whatever. Southern Pine Lumber Company v. Arnold, Tex. Civ. """\pp. 139 S.W. 917;
Allen v. Allen, 48 Minn. 462, 51 N.W. 473; 13 Cyc.
551 ; 8 RCL 956. '' (Emphasis ours)
Another rase directly in point is Curlee, et al., v.
}Jorris, 196 Ark. 779, 120 S."\V. 2d 10 (1938). There, T. E.
Cockrum and his "\\rife deliYered a deed to one. ~fr. Curlee.
The deed was blank as to the grantee and consideration.
Curlee wrote into the blank space for the grantee the
name of his daughter and son-in-la\Y, Lee and Delores
Poynter. The Poynters then proceeded to do \vhat
Stringers did in the case prP~ent ly before the Court.
They mortgaged the property - in this case, to a man
by the name of Wilks. Thereafter, \V.ilks proceeded to
foreclose his m~rtgage. The ('lourt then stated, in an~\\·rr
to its question as to whether under these facts and conditions, the deed \Vas valid, as follo\vs :
"In Adamson Y. Hartman, 40 Ark. 58, the
Court said: 'An instrument of \vriting, pur8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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porting to he a conveyance, signed and acknowledged by the grantor, and otherwise in
good form, does not become his deed until
the name of the grantee and the amount of
the consideration are inse-rted therein. And
an agent cannot fill such blanks in the grantor's absence, unless his authority is in
\vriting.
'' 'Numerous cases are cited in support of
the decision; and, whatever may be the rule
elsewhere, it is settled in this state that the
instrument in question could not become the
deed of the grantor unless the name of the
grantee was inserted, and that act could not
be performed by an agent in the absence of
the principal unless his authority was in
'Yriting. It is not claimed that ~Clarence S.
Courton had any written authority to insert
the name of Clyde B. Seale as grantee.' ''
The Court stated further:
"Since it must be determined that this deed
'''"as void, then Lee Poynter and his wife certainly
took no title under it, and it is not seriously insisted, though perhaps argued to some extent, that
they were or could have been innocent purchasers
under the said conveyance. The truth is, that
there is no insistence that they paid anything for
the land or that they were purchasers at all ... ''
"It is insisted that Wilks is an innocent party
to this proceeding. While we do not think that he
was, it apparently makes no difference under the
conditions above stated. He merely took a mortgage from one 'vho had no more title to the land
than if he had held it under a forged deed, without knowledge of the forgery. If Wilks was not
guilty of any bad faith in the transaction the most
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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he was entitled to receive \Vas a judgment against
those who had benefited by his beneficence. He
certainly was not entitled to have a lien declared
against land that did not belong to the Poynters
who executed the mortgage . . . ''
The Court then approved a rescission of the contract
and restored the parties to the positions in \\Thich the
Court found them, giving to the mortgagee a Judgment
against the mortgagor, but refusing to allo\v a lien upon
the property, and returned the property to the Plaintiff, free and clear of the mortgage.
The Defendant has based its appeal on the doctrine
that \vhere two innocent people suffer because of the
wrongful act of a third person the la "T should protect
the person who is not responsible for allo,Ying the misdeed to take place and cites in support of this contention,
Tjiffany On Real Property, Third Edition, Section 969.
It should be noted that in the excerpt rited by the . Appellant, a portion is as follo\\Ts.
'' ... As regards an innocent grantee or purchaser on the other hand, it might frequently be
valid on the grounds of estoppel, provided at least
he pays value.'' (Empha~is ou1·s)
Thus, it is recognized that there i~ a necessity of
Defendant showing that an estoppel ~hould apply in the
case. The statement does not advocate, as the Defendant \vould have us believe, that the mere delivery of a
blank deed is sufficient to rai~e such an P~toppel. This
position is further emphasized h~T continuing on "~ith
the paragraph quoted hy thP Defendant, starting im-

10
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mediately follo,ving \Vhere the Defendant leaves off,
\vhieh RtatPs as follows:
'' ... One thus signing a deed in blank is, however, not guilty of negligence as a. matter of law,
a distinction being made in some of the cases in
this respect between negotiable and non-negotiable instruments.''
The Trial Court specifically found and made as one
of its c~onclusions of Law, that thPre \Vere no circumstances, based on the evidence presented to it, "Thirh supported any contention that an estoppel should apply in
this rase (R-30). The fact that there are uo circumstances amounting to an estoppel in this case is readily
sPPn by determining what elements are necessary to
establish estoppel. The rule is stated in 19 Am. J ur. 642,
Estoppel, Section 42, as follows:
''The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as related to the party estopped are: (1) Conduct \vhich amounts to a false representation or
concealment of material facts, or, at least which
is calculated to convey the impressio11 that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent \vith,
those \vhich the party subsequently attempts to
assert; (2) intention, or least expectation, that
such conduct shall be acted upon by the other
party; ( 3) kno\vledge, actual or constrctive, of the
real facts. As related to the party claiming the
Pstoppel, they arc : ( 1) Lack of knowledge and
of the truth as to the facts in question ; ( 2) reliance
upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3)
action based thereon of such a character as to
change his position prejudicially.''
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In this case, the fa~ts show that the deed was brought
to the Defendant's office by Mr. Stringer, which is an
unusual practice in itself, and that the Defendant disbursed on the loan without checking the record and first
recording the deed. This is clearly evident by the
fact that it recorded the deed first in Salt Lake County,
before having the deed recorded in Davis, the proper
County. Further, it is evident that no adequate physical
inspection was made of the premises and no inquiry was
made to deterririne the rights of the parties in possession ·
or to whom the parties in possession were paying rent.
If this had been done, it would have been evident to the
Defendant that the Plaintiffs were still in possession of
the premises ; were collecting rent and were working on
the premises for an eight-hour period during each of
these days and during the time that such inspection
should have been made (TR-16). Any inquiry on the part
of the Defendant would have brought to its attention the
knowledge that the Plaintiffs claimed to be the o'vners
of the property. It is uncontrovertible, from the evidence,
that the Defendant, in fact, was not relying upon the
property for security, this being only incidental to the
loan., but that it was looking to the borrower for payment, ,\?hich it may still do.
A case setting forth the proper use of such a doc1riue, as is argued by the Defendant, is found in the
recent California ease of Green Y. M acAdan1, 175 Cal.
App. Rep. 2d 481, 346 P. 2d 474 (1959). There, the Plaintiff brought an action to quiet title to 320 acres of real
estate in San Bernardino County. Briefly stated, the
12
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fa('ts were as follows: Defendant ~lrAdam was an attorney a.t la\v \vho acted as an attorney for the Plaintiff's
ltusband and after the death of the Plaintiff's husband,
acted as an attorney for the Plaintiff. :\IacAdam advised
the Plaintiff that it would be to her best interest to permit him to completely manage the miscellaneous property
left by her husband at his death. The Plaintiff signed
~eYrral blank deeds and delivered them to l\Iar .A. dam iu
.l\ pril of 19;)4. In June of 1954, 1\tiacAdam undertook to
~rll the property to 1\lr. and 2\Irs. l{oskie. One of the
blank deeds \vas filled out, purporting to convey the property to Carol B. Bryson, J\!IacAdam 's secretary, and was
placed of record. MacAdam then had his secretary exeeute a deed, purporting to convey the property to ~I r. an( 1
~~ rs. J{oskie. l\Ir. and ~Irs. l{oskie then paid oyer
$9,000.00 for the property and it \vas found hy the Trial
Court that the Plaintiff had no knowledge of the transaction \vith ~fr. and :3frs. l{oskie or of the recording of
the deed to Bryson until November, 1956. The Court also
found that the Plaintiff had left the blank deed ""'ith 1Iac.Lt\.dam in order to accomplish a specific sale \vhich failed.
The Trial Court further found that the blank deed was
not left there to be filled in for any other purpose than
for the completing of the first proposed transaction
'vhich, as stated above, failed to rna terialize, and that, at
no time, did the Plaintiff authorize any transfer of title
to Bryson or of Bryson's sale to -:\lr. and l\Irs. l{oskie.
The Court further found that the Defendants l{oskie
did not kno\v that the deed to Bryson \Yas a blank deed
and that they relied solely on the representations of )[ac~\dam and made no independent search as to the title.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Trial Court found, as the Trial Court did in the
case presently before this Court, that neither the defense of estoppel nor the defense of laches had been
established and there, as here, no attempt W'as made to
dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings or conclusions and the Court held that the title
be quieted in the Plaintiff, even though they also found
that the Defendants Koskie \Yere innocent purchasers.
Koskies then appealed, contending that they should be
held to be the owners of the property as innocent purchasers under the rule of common la''T embodied in the
California Civil Code, as Section 3543:
''Where one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it
happened, must be the sufferer.''
It was contended that the placing of the blank deeds
in the possession and control of l\iacAdam was the equivalent of negligence within the meaning of the section.
The Court then stated as follow's:
'' ... None of the cases so relied upon involves a
blank deed signed by the owner and thereafter
filled in hy someone else. A material distinction
is to be found in the fact that by reason of the
statute of frauds a.n authority to fill in and complete a. conveyance transferring title to real estate
must be in \Yriting. The rule is thus stated in
Trout v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652, 32 P. 2d 968, 969.
''According to the great weight of authority,
a deed executed in blank is void and passes
no title. Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 613, and
cases cited, infra. As was said in Whitaker
v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381 : 'There must be in every

14
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grant a grantor, a grantee and thing granted,
nnd a deed wanting in either essential is absolutely void.' In the instant case, each of the
instruments signed by Respondent was wanting in all three of these essentials to a valid
deed. Though the decisions of other jurisdictions are not in entire harmony upon the
question, it has been definitely decided in this
state that under our statute of frauds the
name of the grantor or grantee or a des<'ri ption of the property cannot be inserted
hy an agent for the grantor, in the absence of
the latter, unless the agent's authority be in
\Yriting. If the authority of the agent be not
in writing, his insertion of the name of
grantor or grantee or description of the property does not pass the title."
"In that connection it was eontended that because the Defendant was an innocent purchaser
his right to the property under the chain of title
based upon the filled in blank deed should be upheld. The Court disposed of this argument in the
following language:
''Numerous authorities have established the
rule that an instrument wholly void, such as
an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or
a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable
doctrine of bona fide purchase. Promis v.
Duke, 208 Cal. 420, 281 P. 2d 613 ; Gould v.
Wise, 97 Cal. 532, 32 P. 576, 33 P. 323; Barden v. Grace [167 Ala. 453, 52 So. 425, Ann.
Cas. 1912A, 537], supra. Consequently, the
fact that defendant Archer acted in good
faith in dealing with persons who apparently
held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis
for relief. ..:\n innocent purchaser taking a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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void instrument can, however, find protection
in the doctrine of estoppel, where circumstances are presented which establish negligence or some other misconduct by the other
party, which contributed to the loss.''
''The Trial Court in its findings specifically
found that the plaintiff was not estopped, which
finding necessarily implies that there was no negligence on plaintiff's part. The contention of the
appellants, however, is that as a matter of law, the
facts established plaintiff's negligence. The only
facts relied upon are: first, that plaintiff signed
the blank deed and placed it in MacAdam's possession ; and second, that she permitted MacAdam
to retain the deed and did nothing about it for a
period of over two years.''
It is clear that the Defendant in this case is attemptning to do exactly the same as the Appellant attempted
in the Green case; that is, to say that as a matter of
law, the Plaintiff was negligent and thus is estopped.
However, in this case, as in the case just cited, the facts
show that the Plaintiffs merely signed the blank deed
and placed it in the possession of their attorney, Lothaire
Rieh. The case currently before the Court is even
stronger than the California ease for the Plaintiffs, because there the Plaintiff permitted ~IacAdam to retain
the deed and did nothing about it for a period of two
y·ears ; 'vhereas, here a I~is Pendens "ras filed within six
days after the blank deed \vas delivered and prior to the
recording of Defendant's mortgage. The Califon1ia
Court then continued on in it~ consideration of the ease
as follows:
''In order to determine whether the trial court
"Tas justified in its findings and conclusions, cer-
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tain facts must be considered. In the first place,
~11 r. Mac~-! dam was acting as Pla.intijf's attorney,
and in his capacity as attorney at law advised and
requested her to sign the blank forms of quit claim
<leed. He continued as her attorney until she discovered his actions and the purported sale to the
defendants in November, 1956, at "\vhich time she
discharged him. . . . There is no evidence that
plaintiff was negligent in employing him." (Emphasis ours)
"It is of course well established in California
that the relationship of attorney and client is one
of trust and confidence and that the attorney O"\ves
to his client all the obligations of a trustee."
'' ... In addition to that, there must be some actiYe negligenee and the only act relied upon is that
plaintiff failed to anticipate that her attorney
\Vould make a fraudulent use of that instrument or
\Vould perpetrate a fraud upon her."
''But the conclusive answer to the contentions
of appellants lies in the fact that it was found by
the court that an estoppel was not established, the
fact being, as found by the court, that plaintiff had
no kno\\rledge of the wrongful acts, to question
"·hich it 'vas was sought that she be estopped. It
necessarily followed, under the California decisions, that there must be proof and a finding of
negligence on her part. Whether or not a person
is negligent in failing to anticipate fraudulent
actions by an attorney who represents her certainly presents a question of fact for the determination of the trial court. This court may not
substitute its eonclusion for that of the trial
court.''
'' . .L\.s indicated in the Trout case, the defendants are not \Yithout adequate remedy at la\Y hut
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'must seek their recourse against the fraudulent
defendants 'vho occasioned the loss.' ''
Defendant, in its brief, makes a point of the fact
that Lothaire Rich 'vas the Plaintiff's attorney and was
acting for them on their behalf. It would appear that in
Utah, as well as in California, it is not negligence which
may give use to estoppel to deliver deeds in blank into
the hands of an attorney, who is in a fiduciary relationship with you and who is expected to act in your best
interest. Therefore, an estoppel does not apply in thiR
case it it did not in the California case and for the same
reason.

PoiNT

II.

THE AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT TO EXECUTE A DEED FOR HIS PRIN·CIP AL MUST
BE IN WRITING.
Defendant cites in its brief, the case of LeVine, et
al., v. Whitehouse, et al., 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2, (1910)
as authority for the proposition that the authority of an
agent to execute a. deed need not be in writing. However,
the Court, in that case, states:
''As we have observed, at the time the agreemen in qu.estion 'lvas entered into, there was no
statute of this state requiring the agent's authority to contract for the purchaser of real estate to
be in writing; therefore, this case did not fall
within the exception of the general rule mentioned
in the foregoing authorities.'' (Emphasis ours)

18
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The contract referred to in this case was entered into
some time prior to 1905 and as noted in the annotation
found at 27 .A.. L. R., pages 606-610:
"The Utah case of LeVine v. Whitehouse
(Utah) supra, cited under the general rule, was
decided prior to the Statute of 1907 ( Comp. Laws
1907, Section 2463), which reqires that a memorandum must be signed by a 'lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.' ''
This same wording is found in the language of Section 25-5-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
''No estate or interest in real property other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor
any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be
c.reated, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise than by act or operation of la,v,
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing." (Emphasis ours)
Certainly mention is made in the statute that an
agent's authority must be in writing. The LeVine case
does express the Utah law, insofar that at the time the
case was decided, there was no statute requiring the authority to be in writing, but it is also recognized in the
case, that the transaction had occurred prior to the
passing of the statute requiring such written authority.
This requirement is also necessary to fill in blanks in a
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deed. Tiffany On Real Prop-erty, Third Edition, Section 969:
''These decisions do not, however, meet the
difficulty presented by the statutes in force in a
number of states requiring a conveyance to be
signed by the grantor or by an agent 'authorized
in writing.' In the presence of such a statute it
is difficult to understand how such an essential
part of the conveyance as the designation of the
grantee can be the act of an agent without written
authority.''
There can be no question from the foregoing, but
that the Utah Statute requires that an agent's authority
to fill in the name of a grantee must be in writing and that
the· Utah Supreme Court has recognized this fact. It is
also without question that in the case presently before
the Court, the person filling in the name of the grantee
was not an agent of the grantor, nor was there any authority to fill in the blank, either oral or written, and thus,
the deed is a nullity and not capable of transferring title,
by virtue of the legislative demands of the Statute of
Frauds.
CONCLUSION
It is Plaintiffs' position that a deed executed ,,. ith
the name of the grantee left blank is a nullity unless it is
filled in by the grantor or by his agent ''thereunto authorized in writing'' and that in the case now· before the
Court, the deed 'vas not filled in by the grantor nor by his
agent nor by anyone authorized in writing to do so, and
that, as a result, the deed is a nullity; further, that the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply in this case, inasmuch
20
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as the Trial Court found specifically that there w·as no
<·stoppel and there has been no showing whatever by
the Defendant that the Plaintiffs were in any way subject
to the doctrine of estoppel and, thirdly, that the Defendant is precluded from claiming a lien on the property by
reason of the foregoing, together 'vith the fact that at all
times Plaintiffs remained in possession of the property;
claimed an interest therein; collected the rents therefrom and filed a Lis Pendens prior to the recording of
any mortgage by the Defendant. Thus, Defendant is precluded from claiming any lien by virtue of the recording
art of the State of Utah.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the mortgage on
the subject property be held invalid and that the judgment of the lower court be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

KIRTON AND BETTILYON
VERDEN E. BETTILYON and
GEoRGE J. RoMNEY
336 So. 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
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